[J3] - DAOmocracy 🏅

DAOs have an engagement problem. Members don't vote because
- They are overwhelmed by the amount of governance activity
- There is no incentive to vote

DAOmocracy resolves this problem by
- Distributing governance across the DAO through random delegation
- Rewarding individuals for votes that help the DAO

Through DAOmocracy, any member can submit for a DAO decision. He or she specifies the amount requested from the treasury and the automated actions to execute if approved. Upon submission, DAOmocracy opens a forum about the decision that all DAO members can post in. After the forum period ends, DAOmocracy uses Chainlink's Verifiable Randomness to prompt a sample of random representatives in the DAO to make the decision. The prompt includes a link to the forum plus explanations of the rules and conditional actions. The sample size depends on the DAO’s size and the amount requested. If a representative does not respond before the preset timeout, a new representative is prompted. DAOmocracy collects the votes and implements the decision if consensus is achieved. 

Three kinds of rewards are available and more or less suitable to different applications of DAOmocracy. Participation rewards go to every representative who voted. These are most appropriate for gratuity and decisions that don’t impact collectively, such as dispute resolution. Consensus rewards go to the representatives who voted for the outcome. These are most appropriate for decisions that have evidence to consider, such as treasury transactions and contract fulfillment. Retroactive rewards entail a delayed follow-up vote about whether or not the original decision benefited the DAO. They go to the representatives who voted in line with the majority opinion of the follow-up and are most appropriate for speculative decisions, like community improvement proposals and grants.